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1  | INTRODUC TION
During the course of my philosophical enquiry and legal research on 
the medical treatment of transgender and gender non-conforming 
(TGNC) children, it has been important to understand that the clini-
cal classification of gender diversity in children is a complex and con-
tentious issue to navigate. This is because there is a strong argument 
that clinical and diagnostic classification of TGNC children implies 
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ABSTRACT
There have been ongoing debates as to how, or even whether, we should clinically 
classify gender diversity in children through clinical classification manuals. So-called 
‘depathologizing’ is argued as being vital to address the stigma that these children are 
somehow disordered or sick. Yet one argument in favour of continued clinical clas-
sification for transgender and gender non-conforming children is that it better facili-
tates access to specialist psychological support. I argue that whilst continued clinical 
classification offers a seemingly pragmatic solution to ensuring access, it does in fact 
obscure our understanding of the individual needs of these children. In this paper I 
address fundamental issues that aim to better our understanding of need and thus 
why a child may benefit from specialist support. I do so by critiquing a paper I nearly 
wrote, which argued for the ongoing continued classification of gender incongruence 
in children. Ultimately, I argue that specialist psychological support and care should 
be driven by the needs of the individual child, as determined by the child and those 
involved with their care. By bettering our understanding as to why specialist psycho-
logical support may be beneficial for some, we move past the focus of such specialist 
support being provided because of the child’s gender diversity. Methodologically the 
paper may be unusual, in comparison to traditional normative counter-argumentative 
bioethical position papers, but by presenting an argument for depathologization of 
gender diversity of children in this way there is also an alternative insight into the 
methods of bioethics.
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that these children and young people are somehow mentally disor-
dered or sick.1 Yet, one important argument in favour of continued 
clinical classification is that it better ensures access to specialist psy-
chological support for children and their families within gender iden-
tity development services.2
Given that, for at least some children, specialist psychological 
support may be beneficial, it seemed logical to write a paper in sup-
port of the continued clinical classification within the 11th version of 
the ‘International classification of diseases for morbidity and mortal-
ity statistics’ (ICD-11).3 However, despite this seemingly logical argu-
ment there was a problem that I would be directly contributing to; by 
justifying clinical classification as having a pragmatic purpose, our 
understanding of these children’s needs is obscured. Whilst this is 
ethically problematic, I suggest that it also has profound implications 
for TGNC children and the provision of specialist psychological sup-
port that should be available to them.
It is important from the outset to acknowledge that there is a 
worrying misconception that depathologization of TGNC identities 
in children should further support the case for delaying all medical 
gender affirming interventions until adulthood. Rather, these ar-
guments are intended to help better understand the approach we 
should take in supporting TGNC children and do not reduce the le-
gitimacy of the provision of therapeutic medical interventions.
In this paper I argue that in order to better ensure specialist psy-
chological support for TGNC children, we need to better understand 
the ethical basis of the ‘need’ for clinical support in these children.
Importantly, to do so means that we need to remove clinical classifi-
cation of gender diversity4 in children. Nonetheless, the approach I 
take in this paper is slightly unorthodox, as within it I challenge my 
own arguments as to the importance of clinical diagnostic classifica-
tion manuals through a critical commentary of a paper I almost 
wrote. By focussing on a paper that was almost written, I will demon-
strate that there is value in challenging our own, seemingly logical 
and pragmatic, arguments to better understand questions that re-
main unaddressed.
Methodologically I appreciate that the paper may be unusual, in 
comparison to traditional normative counter-argumentative bioeth-
ical position papers. So, this paper therefore does two things: one 
is to offer an argument for depathologization of TGNC identities 
in children; the other is to offer some insight into the methods of 
bioethics. The discipline of bioethics is an internal dialogue and a 
continued exercise of analysis and self-analysis. Bioethics should 
not be viewed as simply finding reasons for and against certain nor-
mative propositions, but it is also remaining sceptical about one’s 
normative assumptions, even when these appear well defended and 
logical. Subsequently bioethics can be frustrating, but one way in 
which this can be methodologically addressed is to finish and then 
completely restart from scratch. In this paper I offer a vivid example 
of how this methodology works and how deconstructing finished 
work is imperative, particularly when dealing with such sensitive and 
important issues that affect healthcare provision and therefore the 
people’s lives. Whilst I could have published a neat, clear and simple 
paper with a well ‘wrapped up’ argument, I instead demonstrate how 
‘unwrapping’ and deconstructing our own arguments, although chal-
lenging, is necessary and important.
2  | ‘THE PAPER I  ALMOST WROTE’
In 2019 the World Health Organization continued with clinical 
classification of incongruent gender identity, albeit reclassified, 
within the published and revised ICD-11.5 Whilst primarily the ICD 
supports countries to collect and report health statistics using the 
coding system set out within it, the ICD further supports countries 
to identify healthcare needs and then to facilitate improved access 
to appropriate care and services.6 Hence classification is particu-
larly important for those who may be susceptible to being margin-
alized as a result of a specific health issue and thus become less 
likely to be able to access healthcare in relation to it.7 Indeed, 
TGNC children and adults have suffered various barriers to ac-
cessing specialist support, including the inconsistent ways in 
which healthcare systems provide or design services and the way 
in which societies and cultures even consider gender diversity.8 
TGNC people often face discrimination,9 which can make every 
day needs difficult to achieve and can cause psychological harm.10 
The further harm of not being able to access specialist support is 
well documented as being detrimental to the mental well-being 
 1Mulvey, K. L., & Killen, M. (2015). Challenging gender stereotypes: Resistance and 
exclusion. Child Development, 86(3), 681–694.
 2Drescher, J., Cohen-Kettenis, P., & Winter, S. (2012). Minding the body: Situating gender 
diagnosis in the ICD-11. International Review of Psychiatry, 24, 568–577.
 3World Health Organization. (2018). ICD-11 Mortality and morbidity statistics, chapter 
17. Retrieved from https://icd.who.int/dev11/ l-m/en#/http%3a%2f%2fid.who.int%2ficd 
%2fent ity%2f577 470983
 4Throughout the paper I use the term transgender and gender non-conforming children 
(TGNC) to describe gender diversity that is characterized by an experienced gender 
identity that differs from the normative expected cis-gender identity corresponding to 
natal sex characteristics. I accept that it may be viewed as problematic to even use 
terminology to differentiate these children, but I do so to consider the experienced 
identities of a population who must be better supported. Whilst I also use the term 
gender diversity as an umbrella term in some parts of the paper, it is intentional and is 
used to identify a broader sense of gender diversity in respect of binary societal and 
clinical heteronormative expectations.
 5World Health Organization, op. cit. note 3.
 6Chou, D., Cottler, S., Khosla, R., Reed, G. M., & Say, L. (2015). Sexual health in the 
International Classification of Diseases (ICD): Implications for measurement and beyond. 
Reproductive Health Matters, 23(46), 185–192.
 7Winter, S., Diamond, M., Green, J., Karasic, D., Reed, T., Whittle, S., & Wylie, K. (2016). 
Transgender people: Health at the margins of society. The Lancet, 388, 390–400.
 8Ibid.
 9In Europe see: Council of Europe. (2009). Commissioner for Human Rights. Issue paper: 
Human rights and gender identity. Retrieved from https://wcd.coe.int/ViewD 
oc.jsp?id=1476365; see Section 7 of the Equality Act 2010 for an example of legislative 
prohibition of discrimination against transgender individuals or groups. Retrieved from 
https://www.legis lation.gov.uk/ukpga/ 2010/15/secti on/7
 10Ibid. Council of Europe. (2009).
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and health of TGNC adults and children.11 So, on this basis I would 
have argued that in principle, continued inclusion within the ICD 
seems a good thing, insofar as it facilitates access to specialist psy-
chological support and care.
The WHO decided to place the condition, now named ‘gen-
der incongruence’, in a new category called Conditions Relating 
to Sexual Health but I would argue that this new category is spe-
cifically inappropriate for gender diverse children. Consequently, 
I wanted to write a paper in which I would discuss where, instead, 
this condition should be placed to better support access to spe-
cialist psychological support and care within gender identity de-
velopment services.
I therefore wrote a draft paper, which I now call ‘the paper I al-
most wrote’. Within it I considered how we should classify gender in-
congruence in children and I explored the following issues: whether 
reclassification as a condition relating to sexual health was appro-
priate, whether we should revisit the suggested inclusion of gender 
incongruence being considered as a factor influencing health status 
and contact with health services (within so-called Z codes in the ICD) 
and finally whether there was actually a problem with continued 
mental health classification at all.
In criticizing the inclusion of gender incongruence of childhood 
(GIC) within the ICD-11 as a condition relating to sexual health, I ar-
gued that gender incongruence should be clinically considered as 
more than something related to sexual health.12 In offering an alter-
native I explored the use of Z-codes (factors influencing health sta-
tus and contact with health services) rather than clinical classification 
within the ICD, but accepted that this approach was problematic as 
not all health systems provide access to care for factors found within 
these Z-codes. Overall, it seemed to me that, when considering cur-
rent clinical guidelines for the management of gender incongruence 
and gender dysphoria in pre-pubescent children, the main ethical 
issue that concerned me was GIC being classified as a condition re-
lated to sexual health, not that it was still included in the ICD. This is 
so, because if children need psychological support, then mental 
health classification can be a more straightforward way to access it. 
Moreover, mental health does not mean mental illness. The problem 
was not that it was associated with mental health classification but 
an inference that gender diverse children are mentally disordered in 
some way. To suggest that one person needs psychological support 
at a certain point in life is not to suggest that a person is mentally ill. 
Subsequently, rather than being framed as a disorder, the WHO 
could have developed a chapter entitled ‘conditions related to 
mental health’, acknowledging the potential psychological impact of 
experiencing an incongruent gender identity, but removing any 
pathologized association. The importance of access to and provision 
of specialist psychological support and care within gender identity 
services could be viewed as a positive way in which gender diverse 
children were ensured access to what is an important aspect of clin-
ical care. It seemed to me that clinical classification could facilitate 
such provision, and that removing the condition from classification 
and diagnostic manuals, such as the ICD-11, might result in harm to 
children and families, who might see themselves turned down from 
specialist care in absence of a clinical diagnosis.
I did have worries as to how this argument would be received, 
yet it seemed important to explain that revised classification as a 
condition relating to mental health was actually closer to depathol-
ogization than framing GIC as a condition relating to sexual health, 
potentially implying that gender incongruence is a sexual ‘problem’. 
There is nothing inherently derogatory in suggesting that some of 
us have issues that may influence our mental health and importantly 
the classification of GIC as a condition relating to sexual health is 
problematic.
3  | WHY I  NE VER WROTE THE ‘PAPER I 
ALMOST WROTE’
The most significant challenge to ‘the paper I almost wrote’ is that 
the requirement for referrals to gender identity development ser-
vices to be based on diagnostic criteria, in order to access specialist 
psychological gender identity support, is problematic. In what fol-
lows I demonstrate why this is the case, and why there should be no 
differentiation between other aspects of child development and ex-
periences where psychological support can be accessed without the 
need to satisfy diagnostic criteria. Before putting forward my spe-
cific arguments we must understand and acknowledge that there is 
a well-articulated discourse within the literature between continued 
clinical classification and removing the clinical classification of gen-
der diversity from diagnostic manuals, so called ‘depathologiza-
tion’.13 However, I focus on three specific arguments and I will 
address them individually below.
Firstly, gender diversity is not a disordered or diseased pathol-
ogy, but is an aspect of personality development and expression. 
The fact that we are not able to fully explain why some children 
develop and experience gender incongruence does not imply, nei-
ther does it justify, that they should be classified as suffering from 
a mental health associated condition.14 Moreover, individual gen-
der expression is protected by internationally agreed human rights  11See: Meyer-Bahlburg, H. F. (2010). From mental disorder to iatrogenic hypogonadism: 
Dilemmas in conceptualizing gender identity variants as psychiatric conditions. Archives 
of Sexual Behaviour, 39(2),461–476; Aramburu-Alegra, C. (2016). Gender nonconforming 
and transgender children/youth: Family, community and implications for practice. Journal 
of the American Association of Nurse Practitioners, 28, 521–527; for clinical guidelines see: 
The World Professional Association for Transgender Health (WPATH). (2011). Standards 
of care for the health of transsexual, transgender and gender nonconforming people. 
Retrieved from https://www.wpath.org
 12Horowicz, E., & Giordano, S. (2020). Gender incongruence as a condition relating to 
sexual health: The mental health ‘problem’ and ‘proper’ medical treatment. Droit Et 
Cultures. In press.
 13Suess Schwend, A., Winter, S., Chiam, Z., Smiley, A., & Grinspan, M. C. (2018). 
Depathologising gender diversity in in childhood in the process of ICD revision and 
reform. Global Public Health, 13(11), 1585–1598; Drescher et al., op. cit. note 2; 
Kaltiala-Heino, R., Bergman, H., Työläjärvi, M., & Frisén, L. (2018). Gender dysphoria in 
adolescence: Current perspectives. Adolescent Health, Medicine and Therapeutics, 9, 
31–41.
 14Langer, S., & Martin, J. (2004). How dresses can make you mentally ill: Examining 
gender identity disorder in children. Child and Adolescent Social Work Journal, 21(1), 5–21.
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and domestic equality legislation, prohibiting discrimination on 
the basis of gender identity. The purpose of these legal doctrines 
is to promote societal equality and address unacceptable societal 
hostilities, on the basis that they are harmful to individuals and 
groups.15 Where a clinical mental health diagnosis exists in re-
sponse to the present inability to understand the aetiology of gen-
der identity formation in children and does so knowing that this 
potentially exacerbates societal inequality and hostility towards a 
specific group, then this should be regarded as discriminatory.16
Secondly, whilst discrimination is unlawful, it also contravenes 
the professional obligations of health and social care professionals to 
practice in a way that recognizes individual patient/service user di-
versity.17 By pathologizing gender diversity, we could suggest that 
doctors and other clinicians are breaching the fundamental principle 
of non-maleficence by failing to consider the harm of pathologizing 
these children. I would argue that consideration of the principle of 
non-maleficence within the care of TGNC children has focussed on 
the harm of clinical interventions.18 Whilst I am not saying that these 
arguments are not important, we should at least consider the psy-
chological harm caused by clinically classifying ordinary childhood 
diversity.19 There is of course an argument to say that clinical classi-
fication may protect children and ensure ongoing referral if they are 
at risk of not being supported by their primary clinicians on the basis 
of the clinician’s personal ideology, in respect of gender identity.20 
However, this argument simply confirms that doctors should not dis-
criminate against patients and service users, particularly where the 
characteristic in question is protected by law. Moreover, even if we 
were to remove clinical classification, absence of clinical diagnosis is 
never grounds for a clinician to not provide support or care in some 
way for a patient.21
A further particular professional issue in the case of TGNC chil-
dren is why parents may seek clinical medical support in the first in-
stance and how this may further influence ongoing referral. 
Subjective ideologies as to what a child’s gender identity ‘should’ 
look like may confound the problem by potentially aligning with 
objective diagnostic criteria, and thus may perhaps strengthen the 
clinical need for ongoing referral. I will return to this point in more 
detail later, but here we can say that clinicians making referrals on 
the basis of both objective criteria being met in some way and sub-
jective parental opinion is potentially harmful. Professionally doc-
tors must focus on the needs of the child and act in a way that places 
the best interests of the child as being paramount.22
Thirdly, there is no logic in the following position: clinical clas-
sification facilitates provision of care. There are, in fact, many 
ways in which children are offered specialist psychological sup-
port without them requiring diagnostic clinical classification. For 
example, children may benefit from specialist psychological sup-
port in coping with or processing parental separation, the provi-
sion of which does not require any form of diagnostic clinical 
classification.23 Furthermore, child and adolescent mental health 
services have significantly shifted away from diagnostic certainty 
and ‘labels’, towards addressing behaviours and presentations.24 In 
essence, and I will return to this argument later, psychological sup-
port is well regarded as being beneficial to the well-being of many 
children without it being based on any clinical diagnostic 
rationale.
In shifting away from this position, I had to confront the origi-
nal concern that inspired ‘the paper I almost wrote’, that TGNC 
children are vulnerable and therefore clinical care must be avail-
able to support these children and to further the understanding of 
gender diversity in children.25 However, I failed to acknowledge 
that clinical classification may even do the opposite. As Karter and 
Kamens argue, diagnostic and statistical manuals might disadvan-
tage individuals and groups experiencing poor mental health and 
well-being by focussing the emphasis on addressing diagnostic cri-
teria as symptoms to alleviate, rather than focussing on individual 
needs.26
I had planned to argue that classifying and terming GIC broadly 
as a condition relating to mental health does not need to be con-
sidered as detrimental; some TGNC children may need specialist 
psychological support because they may be confused about their 
identity or may be trying to manage social responses that may be 
ambivalent or hostile or both. This is not to say that the child is de-
viant, is ill or is mentally disordered and as such this is where diag-
nostic classification criteria had an advantage in that, if rewritten, 
they could reflect this position. Yet, if one accepts my arguments 
 15Winter et al., op. cit. note 7.
 16Moleiro, C., & Pinto, N. (2015). Sexual orientation and gender identity: Review of 
concepts, controversies and their relation to psychopathology classification systems. 
Frontiers in Psychology, 6, 1511.
 17General Medical Council. (2013). Good medical practice: Establish and maintain 
partnerships with patients. Retrieved from https://www.gmc-uk.org/ethic al-guida nce/
ethic al-guida nce-for-docto rs/good-medic al-pract ice/domai n-3---commu nicat ion-partn 
ershi p-and-teamw ork#parag raph-46
 18See: Priest, M. (2019). Transgender children and the right to transition: Medical ethics 
when parents mean well but cause harm. The American Journal of Bioethics, 19(2), 45–59; 
Harris, R. M., Tishelman, A. C., Quinn, G. P., & Nahata, L. (2019). Decision making and the 
long-term impact of puberty blockade in transgender children. The American Journal of 
Bioethics, 19(2),67–69; Priest, M. (2019). Response to commentaries on “Transgender 
children and the right to transition”. The American Journal of Bioethics, 19(6), 10–15.
 19Capous-Desyllas, M., & Barron, C. (2017). Identifying and navigating social and 
institutional challenges of transgender children and families. Child and Adolescent Social 
Work Journal, 34(6), 527–542.
 20Allen, B. J. (2019). Primary care of transgender children and adolescents. Transgender 
medicine. In L. Poretsky & W. Hembree (Eds.), Transgender medicine. Contemporary 
endocrinology (pp. 69–92). Cham: Humana Press.
 21Stanley, D. E., & Sehon, S. R. (2019). Medical reasoning and doctor-patient 
communication. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice, 25(6), 962–969.
 22General Medical Council. (2007). 0-18 years: Guidance for all doctors. Retrieved from 
https://www.gmc-uk.org/-/media/ docum ents/0_18_years_engli sh_0418p df_48903 188.
pdf?la=en&hash=30924 48DA3 A5249 B297C 4C5EA EF1AD 7549E EB5C7
 23D'Onofrio, B., & Emery, R. (2019). Parental divorce or separation and children's mental 
health. World Psychiatry, 18(1), 100–101.
 24Callaghan, J. E., Fellin, L. C., & Warner-Gale, F. (2017). A critical analysis of child and 
adolescent mental health services policy in England. Clinical Child Psychology and 
Psychiatry, 22(1), 109–127.
 25Drescher, J., Cohen-Kettenis, P., & Reed, G. (2016). Gender incongruence of childhood 
in the ICD-11: Controversies, proposal, and rationale. The Lancet Psychiatry, 3(3), 
297–304.
 26Karter, J. M., & Kamens, S. R. (2019). Toward conceptual competence in psychiatric 
diagnosis: An ecological model for critiques of the DSM. In S. Steingart (Ed.), Critical 
psychiatry (pp. 17–69). Basel, Switzerland: Springer.
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as being valid and thus is open to there being no basis to support 
continued clinical classification, we are left with a much more pro-
found problem. Whilst clinical diagnostic and classification man-
uals give us seemingly measurable and identifiable presentations 
of those who experience an incongruent gender identity, another 
way we could view them is to say that they could potentially dis-
tort our ability to truly understand the needs of individual TGNC 
children. However, without clinical diagnostic classification, who 
should decide that a child needs support and on what basis? To 
address this, we must understand in the first instance how we 
even consider what it is that a child displays or expresses to war-
rant consideration of ‘need’ or ‘needing’ specialist psychological 
support.
4  | WHAT IS IT THAT MAKES A CHILD 
GENDER DIVERSE?
GIC is defined in the ICD-11 as being
characterized by a marked incongruence between 
an individual’s experienced/expressed gender and 
the assigned sex in pre-pubertal children. It includes 
a strong desire to be a different gender than the as-
signed sex; a strong dislike on the child’s part of his 
or her sexual anatomy or anticipated secondary sex 
characteristics and/or a strong desire for the pri-
mary and/or anticipated secondary sex characteris-
tics that match the experienced gender; and 
make-believe or fantasy play, toys, games, or activi-
ties and playmates that are typical of the experi-
enced gender rather than the assigned sex. The 
incongruence must have persisted for about 2 years 
and cannot be diagnosed before age 5. Gender vari-
ant behaviour and preferences alone are not a basis 
for assigning the diagnosis.27
Distress is not directly referred to in the GIC definition, but 
there is an emphasis on dislike of natal genital anatomy with a de-
sire for alignment to match this to the secondary sex characteris-
tics of the experienced gender. Alternatively the ‘US diagnostic 
and statistical manual of mental disorders’ (DSM-V) is more con-
cise in focussing on the associated distress as gender dysphoria, 
defining it as ‘a strong desire to be of the other gender or an insis-
tence that he or she is the other gender’.28 To support diagnosis 
the DSM-V highlights that children should have ‘Clinically signifi-
cant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other areas 
of functioning’.29
Previously, I would have had to accept that these descriptors 
would need to exist and that children who match these descriptions, 
or fulfil these criteria, are in principle eligible for care. However, 
there are problems in setting diagnostic criteria for gender diversity, 
already well illustrated in the literature both concerning adults and 
children.
One important criticism of the GIC definition and diagnostic 
criteria in the ICD-11 is the uniform definition of GIC presentation 
that is expected to fulfil this objective criteria. Whether it be that 
a child is expected to be playing with toys not associated with the 
gender expected from sex assigned at birth or the requirement to 
experience the gender incongruent feelings for at least 2 years, 
the result may be that without fulfilling these criteria there may be 
restrictions on access to gender identity development services. 
This may lead to parents, or even children, over-emphasizing be-
haviours and distress as they realize that these are the ‘gateways’ 
to support and treatment. The concern is that with objective crite-
ria, parents and children are forced into portraying a certain posi-
tion, which may not truly align with their lived experience. For 
example, a child may experience an incongruent gender identity 
and wish to seek support with the aim of transitioning in some 
way, but does not experience distress associated with this. Thus, 
the net might be too wide, leaving children in need out of the 
radar, or too narrow, medicalizing children who are perfectly fine. 
Nonetheless, in accepting the necessity of these criteria, however 
broad or admittedly imprecise, the alternative of there being no 
clinical diagnostic classification would be more problematic and 
detrimental to children. Yet, the term incongruence simply reflects 
binary norm expectations and does not consider the spectrum of 
gender identity, which may not correspond with incongruence to-
wards genitalia or other physical sex characteristics.30 Objective 
criteria may thus be unhelpful in facilitating access to care for 
those who do not demonstrate this yet may benefit from specialist 
psychological support. We must then consider what the alterna-
tive is.
Some parents might seek medical and psychological support 
because in their view their child does not conform to their gender 
identity ideals and expectations, regardless of the subjective expe-
rience of the child. Perhaps children might come to the attention 
of clinical services because parents may hope that doctors will give 
them advice on how to ‘reconnect’ their child within their heteronor-
mative standards, perhaps parents may even be motivated by a wish 
to protect children from anticipated difficulties later on in the child’s 
life. Conversely, other parents might be relaxed about gender diver-
sity, and might accept a child’s gender expression, yet might miss the 
opportunity to seek specialist support that the child might in fact 
need or benefit from. The problem in either case here is that paren-
tal subjective identification of TGNC children may not reflect the 
needs of the individual child but has the potential to influence how a 
 27World Health Organization, op. cit. note 3.
 28American Psychiatric Association. (2015). Diagnostic statistical manual of mental 
disorders - 5 Gender dysphoria (in children). Retrieved from www.dsm5.org
 29Ibid.
 30Moser, S. (2017). ICD-11 and gender incongruence: Language is important. Archives of 
Sexual Behaviour, 46, 2515–2516.
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child is identified as ‘needing’ or ‘not needing’ specialist psycholog-
ical support.
If on the one hand we accept that some TGNC children might 
benefit from psychological support, on the other hand we need to 
admit that in individual cases identifying a child as being different 
and in need may be detrimental. In other words, it is not helpful to 
simply identify TGNC children, as this perpetuates the problem of 
them being in ‘need’. However, in order to argue this, we would have 
to better approach how we determine who could benefit from spe-
cialist psychological support. This requires us to explore the basis of 
‘need’ and ‘needing’.
5  | ON WHAT BA SIS DOES A GENDER 
DIVERSE CHILD N EED  SUPPORT?
If we are to argue that some TGNC children may benefit from spe-
cialist psychological support, we must accept that the provision of 
this should consider the needs of each child. There is however a ten-
sion here from the outset when considering and even meeting a 
child’s needs, which is that a child may need something without 
knowing it. Generally, we expect parents to meet a child’s needs, 
these include health, educational and well-being issues that although 
may not be causing a child distress or discomfort may still potentially 
harm the child in some way if not addressed. There are ways in which 
we measure children’s needs, for example through exhibiting suffer-
ing, which often forms the basis of child neglect indicators within 
government policies.31 However, as Giordano argues, there may be 
times that a child does not exhibit suffering but is in fact potentially 
being neglected in some form because needs are not met.32
The fundamental issue is that when considering a child’s needs, 
we must in a broader sense consider how children’s needs ought to 
be understood and framed. This tension spans all considerations of 
children’s welfare and is far beyond the scope of this paper, but at 
the very least we should be sensitive to it when applying this to un-
derstanding how we consider the needs of individual TGNC children.
The current situation is that clinical guidelines focus on objective 
diagnostic criteria of gender dysphoria or gender incongruence in 
determining need for access to specialist support. The World 
Professional Association for Transgender Health (WPATH) 
‘Standards of care’ highlight the importance of psychological and 
psychotherapeutic assessment and support in the management of 
children and adolescents who experience the diagnostic criteria for 
gender incongruence and dysphoria.33 However, even if there are no 
identified feelings of distress or even if a child’s presentation does 
not meet the diagnostic criteria, we should accept that psychological 
support may still be beneficial for at least some TGNC children.
It could be argued that because gender identity requires some 
introspection, adaptation, discovery and self-discovery, this can be 
better facilitated for all TGNC children with appropriate psychologi-
cal support.34 Levine, for example, argues that it is important for all 
children who experience gender incongruence to receive psycholog-
ical support, including those who are functioning without experienc-
ing distress, ‘to ensure that they have the necessary support they 
need and a safe place to explore identities and consider any transi-
tioning experience’.35 However, the argument that all of these chil-
dren should and can benefit from access to specialist psychological 
support within gender identity services is problematic because it 
discounts the notion of diversity and considers children expressing 
gender diversity as a homogenous population. We must accept that 
for some children who are comfortable in their identity and do not 
seek support, there is no basis for them to do so.
A further reason to consider psychological support is to facilitate 
and improve relationships within the wider family group in which the 
child is embedded in. Indeed, an important part of specialist psycho-
logical support in gender identity services is to support parents and 
families, which has been found to be beneficial.36 Thus, understand-
ing the needs of parents and families could potentially better help 
understand the needs of the child.37 By doing so, as Newbould ar-
gues in the context of intersex children, it could be legitimate to con-
sider the interests of those who care for the child and that these may 
be taken into account when children are viewed in the context of the 
wider family.38 However, when clinicians consider the needs of par-
ents to be supported we should understand two points. Firstly, we 
do not pathologize these parents and families as being ‘disordered’ 
because of their experienced concerns and secondly, in the same 
way that I have argued for TGNC children above, we must appreciate 
that not all parents and families ‘need’ specialist support.
A more appropriate way of approaching how we should under-
stand the needs of children is to suggest that needs can only be 
identified through a robust and individualized approach to assessing 
them. In shifting away from the need for clinical classification and by 
addressing these fundamental questions, what becomes apparent is 
that the need for specialist psychological support accessed by an in-
dividual child must then be clinically and societally reconceptualized. 
However, there is a barrier to this and that is the reported relation-
ship between TGNC children and concomitant mental health condi-
tions. Therefore, next I will explain why the perceived relationship 
 31National Institute for Health and Care Excellence. (2017). Child abuse and neglect: 
early help, recognition, assessment and response to abuse and neglect of children and 
young people. Retrieved from https://www.nice.org.uk/guida nce/ng76/docum ents/child 
-abuse -and-negle ct-final -scope3
 32Giordano, S. (2015). The fifth commandment: Reflections on the right to contact, child 
neglect and parental child abduction. The International Journal of Children's Rights, 23(1), 
27–51.
 33WPATH, op. cit. note 11.
 34Kaltiala-Heino et al., op. cit. note 13.
 35Levine, D. A. (2013). Office-based care for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and 
questioning youth. Pediatrics, 132(1), 297–313.
 36Aramburu Alegría, C. (2018). Supporting families of transgender children/youth: 
Parents speak on their experiences, identity, and views. International Journal of 
Transgenderism, 19(2), 132–143.
 37Ibid.
 38Newbould, M. (2016). When parents choose gender: Intersex, children, and the law. 
Medical Law Review, 24(4), 474–496.
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between gender diversity and mental health conditions must be 
addressed.
6  | DOES MENTAL HE ALTH CONCERN 
JUSTIF Y NEED?
A significant argument for accessing specialist psychological support 
is that some TGNC children experience distress and these children 
are at greater risk of experiencing poor mental health in comparison 
to their cisgender peers,39 which was something I had planned to use 
to support my suggested form of continued mental health classifica-
tion. Nevertheless, a significant consideration in the first instance is 
how we should contextualize and understand the relationship be-
tween gender diversity and concomitant mental health disorders 
reported in some of these children.
There are two broad theoretical approaches in understanding 
why TGNC children are at seemingly greater risk of experiencing 
mental health disorders. Whilst I am not suggesting that these two 
approaches are mutually exclusive, I will address them individually.
The first is that mental health issues are co-occurring comorbid-
ities and therefore intrinsic, as a result of the gender incongruence in 
some way.40 In response to whether these conditions are intrinsic 
and as such concomitant with TGNC children, we should be ex-
tremely cautious. We must remind ourselves again that TGNC chil-
dren, like all children, are not homogenous and therefore it becomes 
entirely unconvincing that there can be a predictive and set presen-
tation of mental health conditions as part of gender diversity. 
Furthermore, there is increasing evidence that when TGNC children 
are supported in expressing their experienced identities, that the re-
ported concomitant mental health comorbidities are vastly 
reduced.41
The second approach is that mental health disorders are con-
comitant and occur as a response to extrinsic social, cultural, familial, 
educational and even healthcare experiences, which of course are 
interrelated.42 Perhaps the most significant form of hostility for gen-
der diverse people is stigma, a form of social control to cope with 
abnormality.43 As Winter et al. highlight, TGNC people, including 
children, are marginalized through stigma as a result of expressing 
their experienced gender identity and being widely considered by 
society as having some form of mental health disorder.44 Despite the 
arguments for depathologizing gender diversity in TGNC children 
hoping to reduce the breadth of such stigma and other extrinsic hos-
tile influences, there have been arguments that this will not be 
achieved, for example Drescher et al. argue that they are ‘neither 
compelling or persuasive’.45 Therefore, one way we could argue that 
gender diverse children need access to specialist support and care is 
as a result of stigma and other social hostilities, when it is well estab-
lished that poor mental health adversely affects overall health and 
well-being.46 This was in fact similar to the conclusion I had planned 
in ‘the paper I almost wrote’. However, where I was wrong was in 
arguing that in order to offer mental health support, we need clinical 
classification and a diagnosis.
Irrespective of clinical classification, the above arguments con-
sider the need for provision of specialist psychological support in 
response to specific potential mental harm or distress as somehow 
part of what gender diverse children experience. However, the ar-
gument I put forward in separating the relationship between psy-
chological support and mental health care for TGNC children is this; 
we have framed the two as being conjoined and they should not be. 
Some TGNC children may experience poor mental health but oth-
ers may not, whilst facing the same hostilities in relation to gender 
identity expression. Need must therefore not be understood from 
the position of anticipated or even expected mental health concerns. 
The provision of appropriate clinical mental healthcare should be 
available as it would for any child needing this, regardless of experi-
enced gender identity.
It is not to say that specialists involved in psychological support 
for TGNC children do not also have expertise in the management of 
concomitant mental health conditions, but this support should be 
considered in the context of the mental health issue and not simply 
on the basis of the child being TGNC. The focus of specialist support 
should be on psychological well-being. Given my arguments that we 
need to remove the relationship between the need for mental health 
care and that need for access to specialist support should therefore 
be reconceptualized to focus on the individual child, we must now 
consider whether clinicians are best placed to identify the needs of 
TGNC children.
7  | SHOULD CLINICIANS IDENTIF Y NEED?
Currently the Gender Identity Development Service in the UK is 
subject to ongoing public and professional criticisms in relation to 
the provision of clinical interventions for gender diverse children, as 
part of supporting them in exploring their gender identity.47 
However, perhaps there are underlying problems linked to the argu-
ments that I have set out in relation to need that contribute to these 
criticisms. It may be that because gender diverse children are subject 
to diagnostic classification ‘labels’, the criticisms of gender identity 
 39Langer & Martin, op. cit. note 14.
 40Olson, K. R., Durwood, L., DeMeules, M., & McLaughlin, K. A. (2016). Mental health of 
transgender children who are supported in their identities. Pediatrics, 137(3), e20153223.
 41For example, see: Durwood, L., McLaughlin, K. A., & Olson, K. R. (2017). Mental health 
and self-worth in socially transitioned transgender youth. Journal of the American 
Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, 56 (2), 116–123.
 42Ristori, J., & Steensma, T. D. (2016). Gender dysphoria in childhood. International 
Review of Psychiatry, 28(1), 13–20.
 43White-Hughto, J., Reisner, S., & Pachankis, J. (2015). Transgender stigma and health: A 
critical review of stigma determinants, mechanisms and interventions. Social Science and 
Medicine, 147, 222–231.
 44Winter et al., op. cit. note 7.
 45Drescher et al., op. cit. note 2.
 46Ibid.
 47See: Holt, A. (2020, March 1). NHS gender clinic 'should have challenged me more' over 
transition. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/healt h-51676020
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services, in part, exist as a result of these ‘labels’ implying that this 
group and their needs are homogenous. In no way do I suggest here 
that this how clinicians within these services approach this, rather 
that diagnostic classification implies this. Consequently, any argu-
ments that psychological support and care within these services is 
potentially harmful do not consider the children who experience 
benefit. This is not to discount or ignore criticisms from individuals 
who argue that they have been harmed but again even these cases 
highlight that we cannot consider need in any other way than on an 
individual basis. Removing diagnostic classification is only one ele-
ment of addressing the needs of individual children but doing so 
compels us to question the notion of need for these services, focus-
sing on those who may individually benefit from them and how they 
may do so. Even so, a problem that remains is who is the best arbiter 
of those needs across a child’s development?
Currently, in the UK for example, there are public health and pri-
mary care services that monitor certain aspects of a child’s health, 
such as weight or dental health, as preventative measures. However, 
there is no such preventative approach whereby children regularly 
access clinicians to review their psychological well-being using the 
same preventative approach. In fact, the current approach is that 
such professionals are only accessed when a potential ‘problem’ 
or issue is identified. One possible alternative to the objective or 
parentally subjective dichotomy is a model of individually focussed 
psychological support and monitoring from clinicians across a child’s 
development. This approach would provide an ongoing develop-
mental commitment, through a positive and proactive approach, 
to understanding the individual psychological needs of each child. 
Furthermore, it would be provided for all children and encapsulate 
all aspects of a child’s psychological development. Importantly, this 
approach would not be reliant on any diagnostic classification or 
subjective parental bias to the notion of a child’s needs.
If we accept that clinicians involved with child development may 
be well placed to understand the needs of a child, there is still a fur-
ther question to address. How would referral to specialist psycho-
logical support within gender identity services be framed as being 
beneficial for TGNC children?
8  | DOES POTENTIAL BENEFIT IDENTIF Y 
NEED?
Specialist psychological support may be beneficial for some children 
and access to this must be ensured. In now arguing that this special-
ist psychological support should not be based on clinical classifica-
tion of TGNC children but the needs of individual children, I must 
explain how we can understand it as being beneficial.
Briefly returning to my earlier arguments, understanding stigma 
highlights the potential benefit of psychological support for some 
gender diverse children. In particular those children who are trying 
to express or explore their gender identity but may be subject to 
psychological harm through the process of seeking acceptance. 
Therefore there is a legitimate aim to reduce this. Moser for 
example, suggests that therapeutic psychological intervention en-
ables children to explore their gender identity in a safe environ-
ment.48 Furthermore, it is logical to consider gender identity 
exploration as being entirely separate to and long before any consid-
eration of gender affirming treatment.49 The key point to focus on 
here is the role of specialist psychological support in benefitting 
mental health and well-being, in the same way that I have suggested 
psychological care does for many other experiences that people en-
counter in their lives.
A further argument is that psychological support may seek to 
address potential frustration that some TGNC children may experi-
ence as a result of being unable to access clinical interventions under 
current clinical guidelines.50 Interventions for pre-pubescent chil-
dren experiencing GIC or gender dysphoria within current clinical 
guidelines only include psychological management, which is strongly 
influenced by the high reported recordings of discontinuation or ‘de-
sistance’ of GIC and gender dysphoria upon reaching, during and 
after puberty reported within the literature.51 Whilst the studies in 
relation to so called ‘desistance’ and ‘persistence’ are the subject of 
recent criticism, both ethically and in respect of their validity and 
generalizability,52 there remains a cautious and non-interventional 
approach within current clinical guidelines. So perhaps we could 
suggest that as well as psychological support potentially being ben-
eficial for some TGNC children coping with frustration, this support 
could also help some TGNC children understand how future gender 
affirming interventions could be recognized as being in their best 
interests.
Supporting a child to understand, and if appropriate explore, 
gender affirming interventions and supporting the mental health and 
well-being of TGNC children are two pragmatic examples of potential 
benefit that may justify a need for access to specialist psychological 
support. However, I suggest a broader approach to understanding 
how potential benefit can identify need for some TGNC children; 
gender identity is complex and we don’t know what a healthy gen-
der looks like, but we can say that gender variance is normal human 
diversity. For this reason, depathologization is in principle the best 
approach and classification of gender variance as pathology is ex-
tremely challenging. However, some children and families approach 
clinical services, some children struggle, some children need help in 
finding the right psychosexual trajectory, whilst others are clearer, 
and some children and families need support in navigating social dif-
ficulties. For all these reasons, it is important to be prompt and offer 
easy routes to health services that are competent in the provision 
 48Moser, op. cit. note 30.
 49Ibid.
 50Ehrensaft, D. (2017). Gender nonconforming youth: Current perspectives. Adolescent 
Medicine and Therapeutics, 8, 57–67.
 51WPATH, op. cit. note 11.
 52Temple Newhook, J., Pyne, J., Winters, K., Feder, S., Holmes, C., Tosh, J., … Pickett, S. 
(2018). A critical commentary on follow-up studies and “desistance” theories about 
transgender and gender-nonconforming children. International Journal of Transgenderism, 
19(2), 212–224.
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of specialist support and that this is distinguished from support for 
other mental health conditions.
Fundamentally, the way in which we must reconceptualize spe-
cialist psychological support is that we should base this on the needs 
of the individual child, just as we do in other areas of supportive 
psychological care. The needs of a child cannot be understood in 
the context of diagnostic classification criteria but have to be under-
stood on the basis of how they may benefit, with clinicians having an 
important role to play. Moreover, we should appreciate that when 
TGNC children are empowered as agents, they should not be dogged 
by a rhetoric of psychological specialist support and care being un-
necessary or by its nature damaging because of a misrepresented 
relationship with mental health.
9  | CONCLUSION
The arguments that I have set out in this paper conclude with the 
same argument I wanted to make in ‘the paper I almost wrote’; TGNC 
children should be ensured access to specialist psychological sup-
port within gender identity development services. Yet far from the 
argument I had planned previously, that mental health classification 
is best placed to ensure access to this specialist psychological sup-
port, I would now argue that what I have set out in this paper does 
far more to ensure this. There are no compelling reasons for gender 
diversity in children to require diagnostic classification to improve or 
support access to specialist psychological support. In removing this 
diagnostic classification, we are left having unveiled the real problem 
of the importance of understanding how we frame need in providing 
clinical support.
In the first instance we must understand that there is no broad 
appropriate or necessary way to identify these children and there-
fore justify a need for psychological care through application of 
objective or even subjective criteria. By accepting this, we are left 
with ultimately recognizing that some TGNC children and some 
families may benefit from specialist psychological support or care. 
Importantly, we should be clear that this specialist support is not 
provided with the intention to treat or ‘cure’ TGNC but with the 
aim of supporting individual TGNC children and potentially their 
families. However, this specialist support and care should be driven 
by the needs of the individual child, as determined by the child and 
those involved with their care, rather than diagnostic criteria or 
subjective individual attitudes towards a child’s gender expression. 
This requires us to recognize that the historical clinical construc-
tion of the relationship between mental health and TGNC children 
must be reconceptualized. It is only by bettering our rationale as 
to why specialist psychological support may be beneficial for some 
TGNC children that we can promote access based on individual 
need. Part of the basis of this need should be psychological sup-
port being provided not on the basis of being TGNC but as part 
of supporting each child’s development through childhood and on 
into adulthood.
As researchers, academics or clinicians we have to be open to 
challenging our own positions, assumptions and enquiry of nor-
mative prepositions. Writing a draft paper and then starting again 
has been a demanding but valuable endeavour to understand what 
is important when our aim is to better support TGNC children. 
Methodologies and approaches should evolve and must do so in 
order to broaden the way in which we frame philosophical enquiry 
into these most important issues. Perhaps the best way many of us 
can do this is to learn from papers that we almost wrote.
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